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Abstract 
The emergence of global supply chains, that is the organization of production processes in factories 
that are part of a network of suppliers located in different countries and specialized in specific 
production phases, brings about a number of major changes in the way the global economy works and 
interacts. To explore more in detail this phenomenon from a microeconomic perspective, in this paper 
we provide evidence on Business Groups, that is network-like forms of hierarchical organization 
between legally autonomous firms spanning both within and across national borders.  
Exploiting a unique dataset of 270,474 headquarters controlling more than 1,500,000 (domestic and 
foreign) affiliates in all countries worldwide, we find that business groups account for a significant 
part of value-added generation in both developed and developing countries, with a prevalence in the 
latter. In order to characterize their boundaries, we introduce an entropy-like metric able to summarize 
the hierarchical complexity of a group and its trade-off between exploitation of knowledge as an input 
across the hierarchy and the associated communication costs.  
When relating these metrics to the performance of affiliates across business groups, we find a robust 
(albeit non-linear) positive relationship between a group’s hierarchical complexity and productivity 
which dominates the already known correlation between vertical integration and productivity. Results 
are in line with the theoretical framework of knowledge-based hierarchies developed by the literature, 
in which intangible assets are a complementary input in the production processes. 
Keywords 
Supply chains; hierarchies; business groups; property rights; organization of production; productivity 
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1. Global Value Chains (GVCs) and Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
The past decades have witnessed a rapid globalisation of economic activity which has significantly 
changed the outlook of the world economy. The fragmentation of production processes and the 
international dispersion of tasks and activities within them have led to the emergence of borderless 
production systems, which are commonly referred to as global value chains (GVCs). The current 
process of globalisation is characterized by an extensive flows of intermediate goods and services. 
According to the OECD, intermediate inputs represent 56 per cent of goods’ and 73 per cent of 
services’ trade among developed economies, with even higher shares for emerging markets 
(Miroudot et al., 2009). 
Much of input trade involves multinational firms locating input processing in their foreign 
affiliates (Hanson et al.,  2003). According to UNCTAD (2013), in 2010 multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and their networks of foreign affiliates account for around 80 per cent of global trade. 
This means that the increasing importance of GVCs and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
go hand in hand. This second novelty was made possible by the increasing liberalisation of 
investments which lead to the proliferation of MNEs, able to extend their activities even beyond 
industrialised countries. 
In particular, the creation of GVCs takes place through a mix of outsourcing and off-shoring 
strategies driven by MNEs, aiming to find access to cheaper, more differentiated, and better 
quality inputs. According to US BEA data, one third of US exports and 45 % of US imports are 
due to bilateral shipments between subsidiaries and parent companies (called ”related parties’ 
trade”). 
Several trade models have been introduced with the aim to explain how GVCs shape 
comparative advantages between countries, among them we consider Baldwin & Venables (2013) 
and Costinot et al. (2013). The starting point of these models is to show the determinants of the 
geographic location of different parts of a value chain. Baldwin & Venables (2013) focus on trade 
costs as an important driver of production fragmentation. However, their model is sensitive to the 
particular configuration of the production process; they introduced the concepts of “snakes” 
and ”spiders” as two arch-type configurations of production systems. The snake refers to a 
production chain organised as a sequence of production stages, whereas the spider refers to an 
assembly process on the basis of delivered components and parts. 
However, actual production systems are comprised of a combination of various types. Costinot et 
al. (2013) developed a trade model which aims to explain how vertical specialization shapes the 
inter-dependence of nations. They propose a model with sequential production, where absolute 
productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among countries. This elementary 
theory of global supply chains predicts that differences in country technological characteristics 
shape the trade relationships and competitiveness among nations. The key feature of the theory is 
that the technological characteristics are exogenous and are approximated by the higher or lower 
probability of making mistakes along a sequential production chain. The model aims to capture the 
idea that because of inefficient economic environment, which leads to less skilled worker, worse 
infrastructure, or inferior contractual enforcement, countries would have different comparative 
advantage in the global value chains. 
These trade models are useful to analyze the current process of fragmentation of production 
but it is of limited use when studying decisions taken by MNEs. The new trade theories 
embedding firm heterogeneity provide useful insights in studying the location of MNEs and their 
affiliates. Starting from the assumption that contracts are incomplete, firms face the problem to 
understand the best organizational structure of production in the global economy. A growing body 
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of literature has emphasized that companies’ organizational decisions depend heavily on countries 
contractual frictions. Firm boundaries and allocations of control over production decisions within 
and across those boundaries are central elements of organizational design. For instance, a firm 
might decide to do business in a country with weak contracting institutions within firm boundaries 
in order to have more ”control” on the production process. However, the lack of contract 
enforceability might also turn firms to independent suppliers in case they offer a better 
performance because it might dilute the integrated party’s incentives to produce efficiently. 
Although the literature has identified a considerable number of trade-offs involving firm 
boundaries, it has largely left open the question of how such trade-offs are resolved in the market. 
A body of literature has examined the question of whether goods are sold within or across firm 
boundaries in the global economy (see, for example, Antras (2003), Antras & Helpman (2006) and 
Helpman (2008) for an overview). In other words, firms in order to minimize production costs 
have to answer a two-dimensional decision problem: whether to source intermediate inputs from 
within the firm or not, i.e. the vertical integration decision; and whether to locate an economic 
activity in the country of origin or abroad, i.e. the offshoring decision. 
In a first attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach, Hart and Holstrom 
(2010) develop a theoretical model in which assets ownership implies non-contractible 
management decisions, thus shifting the focus of the previous literature from the analysis of 
incentives for relationship-specific investments to the organization of management decisions. In a 
complementary approach, Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2007) and Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2004, 2006, 2012) directly model firms as knowledge-based hierarchies, where 
coordinated management decisions are taken on the basis of the available knowledge, considered 
as an intangible and costly input which is complementary to physical inputs in production 
processes. In their theoretical framework an organizational structure is hence endogenous and 
dependent on the costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge among agents involved with 
different tasks within the firm hierarchy. Related to this literature, Marin & Verdier (2010) 
suggest how firms’ organizational decisions are affecting firm performance and the nature of 
competition in international markets. Caliendo & Rossi-Hansberg (2012) empirically find that 
exporting firms increase the number of layers of management as a result of trade liberalization, 
with a more complex organizational design implying a higher firm productivity. A relationship 
between organization and productivity is also present in Bloom et al. (2010), who suggest that 
organization of decision making affects productivity with inverted U-shaped pattern, with 
excessive levels of centralization or decentralization sub-optimal. 
2. MNEs as Multinational Groups (MGs) 
In an economic environment in which GVCs are becoming increasingly important in shaping trade 
and production flows internationally, MGs (or Business Groups, BGs) forms are very common 
across different economic and institutional environments, in both developing and developed 
economies, accounting for a lion share of world value added. In terms of trade flows, a reading of 
the US BEA (2012) data along the dimension of MGs reveals that at least 75 per cent of total US 
trade can be linked to firms organized as multinational groups. A similar exercise for France, 
where transaction- and firm-level data have been matched to the ownership structure of 
companies, reveals that some 65 per cent of total French imports or exports can be attributed to 
firms (domestic or foreign-owned) that are part of a Multinational Group structure (Altomonte & 
Rungi, 2013). 
However, while a large part of economic activity and trade can be attributed to firms 
organized as MGs, these organizational forms have been relatively neglected in the economic 
literature, where usually the focus has been on either individual firms choices of vertical 
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integration or, more recently, on the within-firm organizational design for the transmission of 
management decisions. According to the findings of Altomonte & Rungi (2013), vertical 
integration choices are not independent from the hierarchical organization of production units 
along the command chain. The intuition here is that studying vertical integration while considering 
each affiliate of a MGs as an independent firm, as the literature has done insofar, would miss the 
structural correlation in vertical integration linking affiliates of the same group, thus generating 
potentially biased results. 
MGs are defined as a set of at least two legally autonomous firms whose economic activity is 
coordinated through some form of hierarchical control via equity stakes. Legal autonomy and 
hierarchy are jointly constituent attributes of MGs, distinguishing them from independent firms 
(as these are legally autonomous but operate without impending hierarchies) and from 
multidivisional firms (which are organized through internal hierarchies of branches, but without 
autonomous legal status). Using this general definition, MNEs can also be considered as a 
special case of MGs, since they have by definition at least one legally autonomous affiliate 
located abroad, ultimately controlled by a parent located in the origin country. 
The main difficulty in identifying MGs is related to the notion of control exerted by a parent. 
We opt here for a definition of control as established in international standards for multinational 
corporations (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; Eurostat, 2007), where control is assumed if (directly 
or indirectly, e.g. via another controlled affiliate) the parent exceeds the majority (50.01 %) of 
voting rights of the affiliate and can thus be considered as the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (or 
Ultimate Owner). 
Such a notion of control is not exhaustive, as it leaves outside the boundaries of BGs affiliates 
de facto controlled through minority ownership, or peculiar forms of control derived by some form 
of market advantage (e.g. a monopsony), as well as particular forms of government regulations 
(e.g. .golden shares.). Yet, it has some clear advantages. First, the majority (50.01 %) of voting 
rights criterion creates a unique standard for both domestic and multinational Business Groups. 
Second, it allows to rule out cases of double (or triple) accounting of affiliates among different 
groups, thus generating a definition of the boundaries of a MG which is univocal (technically, each 
of our MGs is a closed set). Third, such a definition of control allows for a straightforward 
comparison with official statistics, as the majority of voting rights is the criterion commonly used 
in international standards on foreign affiliates (Eurostat or OECD FATS) and for international 
tax purposes (IAS, IFRS).  
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Figure 1: Multinational Groups as hierarchical graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 represents the organization of a typical Business Group as it can be derived by the 
application of the majority ownership notion of control. Such a representation corresponds to a 
mathematical object known as a hierarchical graph. The upper shaded node (1) represents the 
headquarters (or parent company), conventionally placed at level 0 of the hierarchy. The lower 
shaded nodes below level 0 represent the affiliates considered to be inside the boundaries of the 
same group, on their different hierarchical levels, with the edges connecting the nodes representing 
participation links. In this graph we interpret edges as control participations, but in a generic 
hierarchy of firms they could also represent trade flows of intermediate goods and services, or 
information flows for coordinated management actions. The white nodes are instead firms possibly 
participated by the considered MG, but excluded from its boundaries on the basis of the majority 
ownership threshold. 
A particularly convenient property of representing Business Groups as hierarchical graphs is 
that it is possible to provide a synthetic measure of their organization through some hierarchical 
form of entropy. We can thus proxy the process of coordinated management that occurs within the 
hierarchy of firms in a BG by exploiting the information on the command chain that links single 
affiliates to the ultimate headquarter. 
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3. Data and GVCs-related metrics of MGs 
Empirically, we lack systematic metrics of GVCs at the firm level. Information on MNE ownership 
structures and financial figures is fragmented, and transactions between co-affiliates within the 
same group are typically not reported. In order to overcome the data constraints the literature 
have studied the GVCs implications for national economies focusing along three dimensions: 
product, sector and country. Dedrick et al. (2008) adopted a product-level approach in order to 
understand who benefits from the fragmentation of the production processes. Cattaneo et al. 
(2010)’s volume assess industry-specific dynamics in diverse global industries, focusing on the 
opportunities and challenges faced by developing countries seeking to enter and upgrade their 
positions within GVCs. Finally, Hiratsuka (2011) studied the production networks in the Asia-
Pacific region using a survey based on Japanese companies operating in Southeast Asia. 
The Bureau Van Dijk data provider allows us to retrieve Multinational Groups for companies 
worldwide. Two different sorts of data have been combined: worldwide proprietary linkages 
provided by the Ownership Database and firm-level financial accounts, from Orbis. Both 
proprietary linkages and financial data refer to the information available in year 2010. 
To identify the UO we developed an algorithm which starts from the bottom of the control 
chain, by classifying all the companies recorded in the according EU27 countries according to their 
degree of independence, as derived from the 50.01 per cent threshold of control. Once the 
algorithm distinguished companies as independent or controlled by other entities, companies are 
then partitioned in three categories: headquarters which are independent companies having 
subsidiaries, i.e. resulting as UO; control group which are independent companies not part of any 
group; affiliates, companies controlled by other entities matched to their respective UO. Affiliates 
are then partitioned in either domestic or foreign (according to their and the UO country of 
incorporation). 
We result in a unique firm-level dataset able to map 270’374 headquarters controlling 
1’519’588 affiliates in 2010, across more than 207 countries and all industries. Given the 
hierarchical graph structure described before, firm-level data of affiliates are stratified according 
to their position in each MG, taking into account the level of proprietary distance from the 
headquarter. For each headquarter and each affiliate along the control chain we have industry 
affiliations at the 6-digit NAICS rev. 2002 classification, including both primary and secondary 
activities from which we can infer measures of vertical integration, as well as balance sheet data 
from which we retrieve proxies of performance and productivity. 
However, not all firms in our dataset report a complete set of financial data. Moreover, country-
level data for some institutional variables we use as controls are not available forevery country. 
Hence, while we discuss here the complete dataset to introduce stylized facts on Business 
Groups, in our empirical strategies we rely on a restricted sample of data in which both firm-level 
and country-level information are available. The restricted dataset still encompasses 208,181 
headquarters (groups) controlling a total of 1,005,381 affiliates in some 129 countries. The general 
properties of the data described here also hold for the restricted sample of Business Groups. 
In Table 1 we provide a geographical coverage of the whole sample by some main 
countries/areas. The headquarters of Business Groups (parents) are classified by their home 
country in the second column, while in the third column we report the total number of affiliates 
they control worldwide, either domestically or abroad, a distinction provided respectively in 
column 4 (domestic affiliates) and 5 (affiliates abroad, i.e. outward FDI by parents). In the last 
column we report the foreign affiliates located in the area, resulting from inward FDI. Two thirds 
of Business Groups are originated in OECD economies, with those headquarters controlling around 
75% of affiliates recorded in our data (66% of which are domestic).  
Carlo Altomonte and Armando Rungi 
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Table 1: Geographic coverage of Business Groups (main countries/areas) by headquarters 
and affiliates 
 
Headquarters located in countries of the European Union, in particular, control 48% of total 
affiliates, of which roughly one third (259,278) are located abroad. The situation is different in 
the US, where around 46% of the affiliates controlled by American headquarters are located 
abroad. Developing countries, not surprisingly, have a larger share of domestic groups, with about 
80% of the 371,577 affiliates controlled by non-OECD headquarters located domestically. 
Confronting the last two columns of Table 1, we can see how the OECD countries attract the vast 
majority (70%) of the 465,928foreign affiliates recorded in our data. We also observe a positive 
difference between outward and inward FDI stock (as proxied by number of affiliates) in 
developed economies, in particular in the case of US and Japan, where the number of affiliates 
located abroad outnumbers respectively more than twofold and fourfold the number of foreign 
affiliates located in the economy. European Union members seem an exception, but in that case it 
is intra-EU FDI activities that makes the net position almost in balance. In developing countries the 
inward FDI stock of firms is almost twice as large as the outward one. 
To validate our dataset we can rely on few references since, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no similar dataset covering control chains of corporate activities both domestically and 
abroad for all countries of the world. One partial exception is the World Investment Report of 
UNCTAD, which compiles yearly a list of the biggest corporations currently operating in the 
world, all present in our dataset with their affiliates. UNCTAD (2011) also reports the number of 
parents and affiliates involved in FDI activities hosted by each country. Based on these data, in 
Figure 2 we report the correlation between the number of headquarters controlling foreign affiliates 
abroad (left panel) and the number of foreign affiliates (right panel) located in each country, as 
retrieved from our sample and matched against the corresponding figures provided by UNCTAD 
(2011): correlations are .94 and .93, respectively. Finally, an indirect validation of the data is 
reported in Altomonte et al. (2012b). In that paper, the authors have matched transaction- and 
firm-level data for France to the ownership structure of companies as derived from our dataset, 
in order to estimate the amount of intra-firm (intra-group) and arms’ length (non intra-group) 
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exports of French firms to the US in 2009. Looking at the counter-factual of official data on US 
intra-firm and arms’ length imports from France, as retrieved from the US Census Bureau, the 
two trade flows turned out to match very closely. 
 
Figure 2: Sample validation: (Logs of ) numbers of multinational parents and foreign affiliates 
by host country in the sample and in UNCTAD (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows how firms that are affiliated to MGs are on average bigger than non-affiliated firms 
along different dimensions: they employ on average 88% more workers, their sales are larger, they 
are usually more capital-intensive and almost twice more protable. They are also 4% more 
productive, even after controlling for size and capital-intensity. Moreover, affiliation premia do not 
display dramatic differences between OECD and non-OECD economies. 
In addition to the superior performance of MGs affiliates, another typical characteristic found 
in the literature on heterogeneous firms is the remarkable skewness of the underlying 
distributions. In terms of hierarchies, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that 57% of firms in our 
dataset represent very simple organizations consisting of one headquarter and one affiliate, while 
about 13% of groups have more than five affiliates and only 0.7% of headquarters control more 
than 100 affiliates. However, the right panel of Figure 3 also shows that those 0.7% of groups with 
more than 100 affiliates are responsible for more than 70% of value added recorded in our data. 
Once the boundaries of Multinational Groups have been identified via a suitable definition of 
control, and the group thus shaped up as a hierarchical graph, the calculation of a group’s entropy 
(its organizational complexity) requires in principle to take into account the different dimensions 
in which the group can be organised: the number of nodes (i.e. affiliates); the edges, i.e. the 
strength of the control links; the number of hierarchical levels, represented by the vertical distance 
of affiliates from the ultimate owner. 
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Table 2: Premia for affiliates of Multinational Groups vs non-affiliated firms 
 
 
Figure 3: Size distribution of Multinational Groups, number of affiliates vs value added 
 
 
Consider for example the case of two ex-ante similar Business Groups present in our dataset: 
General Motors and Mitsubishi. Both groups have a century-old tradition in the production of 
motor vehicles in their own country of origin (the US and Japan). Moreover, in 2010 our data 
report that these two groups have a similar size, as they control 659 and 652 affiliates in 54 and 32 
countries, respectively. Still, when looking at industrial activities beyond motor vehicles, Mitsubishi 
is involved in some ten lines of business (e.g. electronic products, aircraft, shipbuilding, petroleum 
products, chemical products, primary metals, food and beverages, bank and insurance, real estate), 
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while GM beyond motor vehicles provides only financial services for its customers. Accordingly, the 
affiliates of Mitsubishi are able to provide a wider range of intermediate inputs to the group, 
with firms typically operating in 3 or 4 main different industries, whereas the affiliates of General 
Motors seem relatively more focused on one or two main intermediate activities. As a result, the 
degree of vertical integration is higher for Mitsubishi than GM. Crucially, however, Mitsubishi is 
significantly less complex in terms of organization, with a much flatter hierarchical structure 
(with no more than 3 levels of hierarchy within the group), while GM is characterized by a deeper 
(up to 8 levels) and more complex hierarchy of cross-participations in its affiliates. Moreover, we 
also find that the labor productivity of affiliates belonging to the hierarchically more complex 
GM group is on average significantly larger than the one of Mitsubishi’s affiliates. 
3.1 The Global Index of Complexity 
A particularly convenient property of representing Business Groups as hierarchical graphs, as in 
Figure 1, is that it is possible to provide a synthetic measure of their organization through some 
hierarchical form of entropy. We can thus proxy the process of coordinated management that occurs 
within the hierarchy of firms in a MG by exploiting the information on the command chain that 
links single affiliates to the ultimate headquarter. Borrowing from graph theory, the entropy of a 
hierarchical graph G characterized by a total of L levels of hierarchies can be constructed by 
assigning a discrete probability distribution p : L → [0, 1] to every level l in the hierarchy, where the 
probability pl = nl / N is a function of the nl number of nodes on each level l and the total number 
of nodes N , yielding a measure of node entropy which is specific for hierarchical graphs (Emmert-
Streib and Dehmer, 2007). 
 
 
   (1)    
     
The H (G) measure of entropy is characterized by some useful properties: a) it is continuous; b) it 
is additive in L, so that each level l (order) of nodes can be considered a subsystem of the whole 
graph G; c) the measure is maximal when all the outcomes are equally likely, i.e. there is an 
equal number of nodes on each level l. Finally, the logarithmic entropy is also symmetric, meaning 
that the measure is unchanged if levels L are re-ordered. The symmetry of the measure is however 
an unpleasant property when applied to the case of Multinational Groups, since it implies that 
adding one node (affiliate) to the network increases its complexity independently from the 
hierarchical level at which the node is added. The latter is counter-intuitive in the case of a 
hierarchical organization characterized by a headquarter, because one might expect that the degree of 
coordination of the whole control chain (its complexity) should increase relatively more when 
affiliates are incorporated at proprietary levels more distant from the vertex. 
For this reason we have refined the original H (G) formula introducing an additional weight to the 
probability distribution of levels more distant from the parent. After some straightforward 
manipulations we can rewrite our node entropy measure for Multinational Groups, which we refer 
to as Group Index of Complexity (GIC), as: 
 
,    (2) 
where as before the measure is a function of the nl number of affiliates on a given hierarchical level 
l, of the total number N of affiliates belonging to the group and of the total number of levels (L). 
The index can theoretically range within the [0; + ∞ ) interval, with zero now indicating a very 
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simple organization in which a headquarter controls one or more affiliates located just one level 
of control below (l = 1). Moreover, the index retains some desirable properties of the original 
node entropy, as it is (logarithmically) increasing in the number of hierarchical levels. Importantly 
for our purposes, and contrary to the original hierarchical entropy measure H (G), the GIC now 
allows to take into account the marginal increase in complexity brought about by affiliates added 
to lower hierarchical levels. 
The economic rationale for a decreasing marginal complexity when affiliates are added at the 
same hierarchical level is associated to the idea that some economies of scale intervene when 
firms expand their network of affiliates horizontally, while coordination (and communication) costs 
can become more and more important once the network enlarges and deepens by locating 
affiliates to further levels from the headquarter. This is in line with the literature on knowledge-
based hierarchies (see for example Garicano, 2000, or more recently Caliendo & Rossi-Hansberg 
(2012), according to which the optimal design of a management hierarchy is the result of a trade-
off between knowledge and communication. A further layer of management increases the 
utilization of knowledge, for which some economies of scale are assumed, but at the same time it 
also increases the cost of communication along the hierarchy. 
Accordingly, in our case the hierarchical distance from the headquarter implies a higher fixed 
cost of communication (hence our correction for node entropy), while further affiliates on the same 
level imply a decreasing marginal cost of knowledge. As a result, the hierarchical complexity of an 
object such as a Multinational Group cannot simply be proxied by its total number of affiliates N 
or by its number of hierarchical levels, with the index of complexity being not strictly monotonous 
in N . Another way to measure the complexity of the hierarchy developed by a Multinational 
Group could be the explicit introduction of an edge entropy, i.e. considering the strength of the 
cross participations as a further dimension to be included in the entropy index. In this case, the 
index would differ if an affiliate can be finally owned through direct participation (held by the 
headquarter) or indirect cross participations (held by any other affiliates in the control chain). 
However, given the scope of our analysis, the latter would not yield qualitatively different results, 
as we only use data on Multinational Groups characterized by a majority threshold for control that 
includes direct and indirect equity ties, in line with international business statistics. In terms of 
interpretation, that is equivalent to assume that, once the group boundaries are identified through 
control, any share above such a threshold would not significantly affect the complexity of the 
organization, as the headquarter would retain in any case the decision power. 
In Table 3 we report some descriptive statistics that already show how both the node entropy 
in the second column and the GIC in the third column reproduce long right-tail distributions 
similar to the more simple number of affiliates but with some differences.  
Skewness is much higher in the case of N, while H(G) and GIC start increasing rapidly only 
after the 83rd percentile of our sample, differently from the distribution of N which already has a 
right tail from the 75th percentile. Since until the 57th percentile our sample is represented by 
Business Groups having only one affiliate, both the node entropy and the GIC end up with null 
figures until that point of the distribution. However, given the logarithmic weight, also groups that 
have few affiliates but all positioned on a same control level (N = nl ;whatever l) end up with a 
H(G) and a GIC that both have null figures until the 83rd percentile. The top 1% of complex BGs 
has more than 900 affiliates and 10 levels of control, with a GIC higher than 4.7 reaching the 
maximum value of 19. 
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Industry OECD non-OECD
European 
Union USA Japan China Africa
South 
America ASEAN
All 
countries
Mining 0.626 0.356 0.124 0.764 0.339 0.370 0.597 0.924 0.922 0.530
Food 0.650 0.216 0.561 1.537 0.299 0.272 0.760 0.210 0.818 0.425
Textiles and clothing 0.503 0.170 0.426 1.639 0.257 0.134 1.160 0.366 0.836 0.349
Chemical products 0.789 0.278 0.538 1.579 0.455 0.096 0.301 0.293 0.736 0.588
Automotive 0.944 0.424 0.775 2.169 0.501 0.243 2.340 0.113 1.484 0.746
Electronic products 0.736 0.276 0.655 1.032 0.651 0.182 0.950 0.103 0.733 0.537
Business services 0.531 0.205 0.530 0.833 0.261 0.482 0.348 0.073 0.854 0.426
All industries 0.418 0.233 0.410 0.989 0.114 0.311 0.601 0.308 0.808 0.354
Table 3: Comparison of distributions: number of affiliates (N), node entropy (H(G)) and 
GIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 4 we report sample averages of the Group Index of Complexity (GIC), for some selected 
industries and geographical areas. The industry is identified as the core sector where the majority of 
value added is created within the Business Group, even though many larger BGs can be involved in 
more than one line of business. The country is instead the home country where the headquarter is 
located, even though the group can have some affiliates abroad. The third and fourth columns of 
Table 4 show that the hierarchical complexity index is constantly higher for OECD economies 
with respect to non-OECD economies for each reported industry.  
Table 4: Group vertical propensity and organizational complexity (averages) by selected 
industries and countries 
 
 
Groups originated in the US are the ones showing higher figures for hierarchical complexity in 
most industries, while Japanese groups display instead lower delegation of control (they are 
hierarchically less complex). The figures for developing economies show instead a higher variation 
across industries. Looking at the automotive industry in US and Japan, the preliminary evidence of 
the case studies is confirmed on industry aggregates, since the hierarchical complexity of the US 
car industry is higher than Japan. Overall, cross-country variation seems to dominate cross-industry 
variation. 
The evidence that the GIC is characterized by a Pareto distribution, shown in Figure 4, can be 
interpreted in terms of graph theory as a minimum complexity of the hierarchical graph when 
nodes are all adjacent on a same level. From an economic point of viewit makes sense that 
Business Groups having affiliates all located at the same proprietary distance from the headquarter 
 
Statistics N H(G) GIC 
Mean 5.62 0.18 0.35 
standard deviation 32.62 0.43 1.02 
Skewness 28.59 2.43 5.34 
50th percentile 1 0 0 
75th percentile 3 0 0 
90th percentile 8 0.92 1.45 
95th percentile 16 1.00 1.88 
99th percentile 74 1.83 4.70 
Maximum 1000 3.27 19.07 
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are more easily coordinated in the management of their activities. Moreover, if we assume that 
control runs univocally from the headquarter to each single affiliate, the cost of maintaining a 
control chain with only one affiliates and the cost of it where more affiliates are however located 
at the same level are virtually the same. The previous is the reason why GIC (and node entropy) 
is not monotonic in the number of affiliates, since the GIC (and the node entropy) is additive in 
proprietary levels but not in number of affiliates. Groups with the same number of affiliates can 
arrange them in one or more levels and the cost of exerting control through the network is higher 
in the latter case. 
 
Figure 4: A visual comparison of number of affiliates (N) and GIC distributions: mean 
excess functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Group Boundaries and Performance 
Consistent with a large body of literature (for an overview see Helpman et al. (2004), Bernard 
et al. (2011) and Altomonte et al. (2012a)), UNCTAD (2013) find that participation in global 
supply chains is linked to firm productivity using firm-level data.
1
 Compared with non-exporters 
(or non-importers), firms that engage in international activities show significantly higher 
productivity levels. Similarly, firms that engage in GVCs with NEMs have productivity levels 
that are lower than those of MNEs, which have activities in more than one country. 
Internationalization is therefore closely linked to productivity levels of firms. Firm-level 
productivity and country competitiveness go hand in hand. It is firms with high productivity 
levels that are behind countries participation in GVCs, and it is the further improvement of 
these firms productivity that is, to a great extent, behind countries success in upgrading. 
Consistently with these findings, in Table 2 we have shown that also in our dataset firms that 
are affiliated to Business Groups (and thus to some extent might participate to global supply chains) 
are on average bigger and more productive than non-affiliated firms. What remains to be seen, 
however, is the extent to which different boundaries / organizational shapes of Business Groups map 
                                                     
1
 The EFIGE survey data merged with Amadeus, by Bureau Van Dijk, allow to implement Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
estimation algorithm to retrieve a measure of total factor productivity at firm level. Then each firm is categorized in a 
specific group of internationalization. 
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into a different productivity of affiliates. To explore these issues, we test whether the productivity 
levels of BGs’ affiliates are systematically correlated to t h e  d e g r e e  o f  vertical integration 
and/or hierarchical complexity of the group, controlling for a number of additional groups’ 
characteristics. 
In our specification we take as dependent variable (the log of ) labor productivity calculated as 
value added per employee of each affiliate a belonging to the g group, operating in core industry 
k and located in country ca 
 
We also control for the affiliate-level and group-level o f  vertical integration (va(g)kca , vg ), as well 
as hierarchical complexity (GIC
θ
) with θ= 1,2 to control for possible non-linear effects. We also 
control for the hierarchical distance (hdista(g)kca ) of each affiliate a within group g. The latter is 
the level at which the single firm is located within the network of affiliates that form a Business 
Group, as depicted in Figure 1, and can be interpreted as a control for the communication ability 
of the affiliate with the center of decision represented by the headquarter. Controls for capital 
intensity and size at the affiliate level (empa(j)kca , kla(j)kca ) correct for the possible bias deriving 
from the use of a one-factor productivity indicator, at the same time controlling for relation-
specific investments that a firm with a higher capital-intensive production can undertake. Total 
employment is included as a control at the level of the group (empg ), together with a full set of 
(country-per-industry) fixed effects (λ
kc
), in order to neutralize at this stage of the analysis all 
possible differences in institutional environments combined with industrial composition (here 
considered at the 3 digit level of disaggregation), and thus isolate as much as possible the effects 
of organizational design on affiliates’ performance. Errors are clustered at the headquarter level, to 
account for within-group correlation. Results are presented in Table 5. 
Looking at results, when we do not control for country fixed effects, as in the first column of 
Table 5, we obtain a negative correlation between vertical integration and productivity, both at the 
group- and at the affiliate-level. This is because Business Groups and their constituent firms are 
more vertically integrated in developing economies, where institutional frictions are more present 
and firm performance is on average lower than in developed economies. On the other hand, 
including country fixed effects but excluding industry fixed effects (column 2 of Table 5), we find a 
positive correlation between both indexes of vertical integration and productivity, although in this 
case several omitted variables can bias the correlation, among which the degree of market 
competition and the specific contractual completeness of the industry in which the firms operate. 
This is why starting from column 3 we include country-per-industry fixed effects. 
Controlling for country-level heterogeneity combined with industrial composition (column 3), 
we find that only affiliate vertical integration is associated to average affiliates productivity, while 
group integration is not significant. The latter result is confirmed also controlling for foreign 
affiliates (which in turn, consistently with other findings in the literature, are found to be some 
25% more productive than the average firm). 
When also controlling for the hierarchic organization of the group (column 4), we find that all 
the measures of vertical integration lose both significance and magnitude, while hierarchical 
complexity appears to be positively and significantly related to productivity. This result is partially 
in line with the evidence provided by Atalay et al. (2012) in the case of US data, according to 
which much of the positive correlation between plant performance and vertical ownership 
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structures fades away when controlling for firm size as proxied by total revenues, employment or 
number of establishments. However, differently from Atalay et al. (2012), in our strategy we 
distinguish between actual (affiliate or group) size, measured by (affiliate or group) employment 
in the above specifications, and hierarchical complexity, being able to show that also this latter 
dimension matters for affiliates’ productivity. 
The finding that the positive correlation between hierarchical complexity and productivity 
dominates the one between vertical integration and productivity can be related to the theoretical 
framework developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007), 
who model firms as knowledge-based hierarchies. According to this strand of literature, knowledge 
is a typical intangible asset which is complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically 
linked products. Knowledge can be accumulated for example by hiring better managers and 
adopting better managerial procedures, but it has a fixed cost. 
 
Table 5: Productivity levels and Business Groups’ dimensions 
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Therefore, given a firm size (in our case group size), best intangible assets can be shared in the 
presence of a larger number of units of production and hence their costs can be smoothed on a 
larger scale. Our results add to these findings, by showing that, within a Business Group 
structure, besides the positive relationship between group size and performance, also the 
complexity of the command chain is positively correlated with productivity. A well designed 
mechanism for the transmission of knowledge seems here crucial since it allows for an efficient 
exploitation of intangible assets throughout appropriately designed hierarchies able to decentralize 
decisions at the level where they are needed. 
Unfortunately we have no direct information on the actual delegation of authority occurring 
within Business Groups. Still, we can presume that a higher number of layers of management 
(both in levels and nodes) could imply a more complex /delegated decision process. Under this 
assumption, our results can then be considered also in line with the findings of Bloom, Sadun and 
Van Reenen (2012), according to which more delegation of authority implies a higher firm-level 
performance thanks to a better reallocation of resources. 
Our results also show that too complex an organization can also be problematic. As previously 
discussed, our measure of hierarchical complexity takes into account the higher fixed costs of 
communication between the single affiliate and the headquarter when more than one layer of 
management is involved in the decision process. From the point of view of the headquarter, it 
might be efficient to decentralize decisions at lower levels of hierarchies to better exploit intangible 
assets, but at the same time, as coordinating a decision with a distant affiliate is relatively more 
cumbersome, internal coordination costs can become so high that the organization becomes too 
complex to be managed efficiently. To capture this effect, in column 5 of Table 5 we have 
introduced a squared term in our hierarchical complexity variable, which turns out to be negative 
and significant. This latter result is in line with the microfoundation of organization provided by 
Caliendo & Rossi-Hansberg (2012), in which a minimum efficient scale exists in the acquisition 
and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy, associated to the emergence of 
endogenous communication costs. 
Although we do not have information on a groups minimum efficient scale of production, from 
our estimates we can calculate the optimal threshold of complexity after which, ceteris paribus, 
returns from hierarchical complexity start to decrease: this is quite large, as it corresponds to a 
GIC of around 9.5, associated to groups exceeding the number of 550 affiliates and/or organized in 
control chains with over 5 levels of hierarchical distance. Such an evidence of marginally 
decreasing returns from increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth 
in complexity: indeed, only 1 per cent of groups in our sample (the critical value of GIC is 
around the 99th percentile of its distribution) exceed this average ”optimal” organizational 
threshold. 
Finally, as a robustness check of the theoretical assumption of increasing marginal costs of 
communication across hierarchical levels, in the last specification of Table 5 we have introduced a 
control for the simple hierarchical distance of the affiliate, i.e. the length of the command chain 
linking each affiliate to the parent company. We find that on average the further the firm is from 
the decision making center, the lower its level of productivity appears to be. But the latter result 
only holds when we control at the same time for our measure of hierarchical complexity. When 
considering only hierarchical distance in the model, i.e. excluding hierarchical complexity, 
affiliates located at further levels of control would actually display higher levels of productivity. 
This is consistent with the idea that across BGs affiliates located at lower hierarchical levels 
discount a higher positive premium for productivity thanks to the organization effects discussed 
before, while within BGs (that is, when we do control for hierarchical complexity) the higher 
marginal costs of internal communication affects the single affiliate’s performance. 
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5. MGs and transmission of shocks 
Another channel through which global supply chain can affect the competitiveness of countries is via 
their ability to affect the speed and depth of crises acting as a channel through which shocks can be 
propagated. 
Indeed, the “Great Trade Collapse” has been one of the most striking features of the recent global 
financial crisis. Apart from its magnitude, the fall in trade during the crisis has also been quite 
homogeneous across all countries: more than 90 per cent of OECD countries have exhibited 
simultaneously a decline in exports and imports exceeding 10 per cent. The fall has also been very 
fast, with trade virtually grinding to a halt in the last quarter of 2008. Looking at US trade, Alessandria 
et al. (2011) find an extraordinary high trade elasticity to GDP, above 5. All these findings have led to 
qualifying the drop in trade during the crisis as severe, sudden and synchronized (Baldwin and 
Evenett, 2009). A number of transmission mechanisms (Baldwin, 2009) have been proposed which 
could account for such peculiarities, making the latest generalized trade drop quite unique among the 
many episodes of trade decline after a financial crisis (Abiad, Misha and Topalova, 2010). 
Considering the transmission mechanism of global value chains, a first argument is that the magnitude 
of the trade drop is due to a problem of multiple accounting. In a world increasingly characterized by 
vertical specialisation, i.e. with goods produced sequentially in stages across different countries, the 
same component of a final good is exchanged (and thus recorded at gross value as trade) several times 
before the final product reaches the consumer. As a result, for a given reduction in income, trade 
should decline not only by the value of the finished product, but also by the value of all the 
intermediate trade flows that went into creating it (Yi, 2009; but also previously Bergoeing et al., 
2004). 
A second channel that relates the magnitude and the synchronization of the latest trade drop to 
the emergence of global value chains is the inherent adjustment in inventories after a demand 
shock that the existence of inter-firm linkages implies. The wider fluctuations in terms of trade 
elasticities are in this case an overreaction due to adjustments in the stocks of intermediate 
inputs by firms involved in complex supply chains (Stadtler, 2008; Escaith et al., 2010; Freund, 
2009). According to this argument known as the ”bullwhip effect” (Forrester, 1961), each 
participant to a supply chain had a greater observed variation in demand during the crisis and the 
initial negative shock propagated up the value chain. The logic is as follows. When final demand is 
subject to volatility, businesses typically face forecast errors against which they try to shelter by 
building safety stocks of inventories. Upstream participants to a supply chain face greater demand 
volatility than downstream ones, so the need for such stocks rises moving up the value chain. The 
result is that variations in final demand are amplified as one moves away from the final customer. 
When applied to the current context, the foregoing logic implies that, with falling demand, orders 
decreased more than proportionally because firms were able to draw on inventories after 
expectations of lower future demand. Firms involved in value chains reduced their stocks more 
than proportionally while the shock propagated up the value chain. Alessandria et al. (2011) 
successfully tested this argument for the US. 
A role has also been acknowledged for the credit crunch suffered by internationalized firms. 
According to (Bricongne et al., 2011), credit constraints emerged as an important aggravating 
factor for a sample of French firms operating in sectors of high financial dependence. About 20 per 
cent of the contraction in exports of financially constrained firms was explained by their status of 
being financially constrained. This effect seems to be entirely driven by developments in sectors of 
high financial dependence. Nonetheless, as the weight of financially constrained firms is small 
relative to the universe of French exporters, and since their number did not increase much during 
the crisis, the impact of credit constraints on overall trade remains limited. 
Supply Chains and International Competitiveness 
17 
 
To this extent, Altomonte et al. (2012b) exploit transaction level French trade data matched with 
ownership data on Business Groups located in France for the period 2007-2009 to find evidence of a 
role for global value chains in explaining the magnitude of the trade collapse. Consistent with 
other results, they find that trade in intermediates has been the main driver of the trade collapse. 
However we also find that different organizational modes of the supply chain entailed different 
dynamic responses: related party trade in intermediates exhibits a faster drop followed by a faster 
rebound with respect to arm’s length trade in intermediates. In other words, trade originated within 
multinational groups seems to have reacted faster to the negative demand shock but has also 
recovered faster in the following months than arm’s length trade. 
Among the alternative channels of transmission of a demand shock to trade proposed in 
previous studies, the adjustment in inventories seems the most consistent with these findings. 
Indeed, through an adjustment of inventories, amplified fluctuations of trade with respect to GDP 
could be associated to the so called ”bullwhip effect”, i.e. a magnification of the initial (negative) 
demand shock along the supply chain due to an adjustment of production and stocks to the new 
expected levels of output. In this case, our finding of a better performance of related party trade 
could be explained by a better handling of inventories within multinational groups, thanks to a 
more efficient and synchronized (vs. sequential) circulation of information and the ensuing 
optimal management of stocks within the boundaries of the group.  
Clearly, a role for trade credit constraints cannot be excluded, since hierarchies of firms may have 
relied on an internal capital market to soften the crunch of external financing, but that would however 
explain only a faster recovery of related party trade and not the faster drop at the outburst of the crisis. 
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